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HOMICIDE DURING THE COMMISOF A FELONY.-[New York]
Four men were interrupted by three
policemen while robbing a 'speakeasy.' Two of the police officers
entered the place and arrested two
robbers without seeing a third robber, Walsh, who was standing guard
inside the door leading out to the
vestibule and thence to the street.
The third officer stooU guard outside that street door, while the
fourth robber was waiting outside
beside an automobile. Walsh, who
was armed, had seen the arrest and
the disarming of his associates, attempted to escape, but quickly opened the door, stepped back into the
vestibule when he saw the officer
outside the door. Later, however,
he again stepped out and fired the
fatal shot killing, the officer. All
four defendants were jointly indicted in the common-law form for
murder in the first degree, the case
having been tried solely as a felony
murder. The trial judge instructed
the jury that if it believed, beyond
a reasonable doubt, the events as
outlined by the State's witnesses,
then the homicide as a matter of
law was committed during the perpetration of the felony, and the
defendants were all guilty of first
degree murder. All were convicted
as charged and sentenced to die.
Held, reversed and remanded: this
instruction was prejudicial error
SION

for the jury was precluded from
finding the facts in accordance with
the State's testimony, and at the
same time finding that the defendant was not engaged in the commission of a felony when the homicide occurred: People v. Walsh et
al. (1933) 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E.
422.
Two questions -arise 'from this
and allied cases: first, whether a
homicide, committed subsequently
to a felony, is in the perpetration
of that felony, i.e., the termination
of the felony, and second, the status
of an accessory before the fact in
a felony murder. At common law
every 'homicide committed in the
perpetration of a felony was murder, and this was so whether or not
there was any precedent intention
of doing the homicidal act: Washington v. State (1930) 187 Ark.
1011, 28 S. W. (2d.) 1055; State v.
Best (Wyo. 1932) 12 Pad. (2d)
1110. Thus premeditation, deliberation, or malice is not essential to
this crime: Cole v. State (1922) 192
Ind. 29, 134 N. E. 867; People v.
Arnold (Cal. 1926) 250 Pac. 168;
Berryhill v. State (1921) 151 Ga.
416, 107 S. E. 158. It was the
theory of the State in the principal
case that the homicide occurred in
the commission of a robbery and
therefore it was murder in the first
degree and therefore it was not
necessary to prove deliberation,
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often a difficult task: State v.
Sharpe (Mo. 1930) 34 S. W. (2d)
75. But the difficulty arises here in
proving that the robbery was taking
place at the time of the homicide.
If the homicide occurs at the beginning of the robbery, it is not
difficult to say it was done in its
perpetration, nor is there much
question if the robbery is in progress when the killing is done. But
when the homicide occurs during
the escape of the parties the decisions differ somewhat. The termination of the robbery is determined
by the desistance or abandonment
of the intent to rob. The tests applied are many; time, place of commission, possession of loot are all
significant. A shooting about two
minutes after the robbery which
occurred as a part of a continuous
assault lasting from the robbery to
the shooting, done for the purpose
of preventing detection, was held
to be first degree murder: State v.
Williams (1905) 28 Neb. 395, 82
Pac. 353. Where an *accused shot
the deceased in the back after his
money had been taken and he
started to walk away and had gone
five or six feet, this crime was committed: Christian v. State (1913)
71 Tex. Cr. 566, 161 S. W. 101.
Whether or not the stolen property
had been removed and whether or
not the defendant was at the scene
of the robbery are other determining factors: People v. Michalow
(1920) 229 N. Y. 325, 128 N. E.
228; People v. Smith (1921) 232
N. Y. 239, 133 N. E. 574. A different test often is used, namely,
whether the robbery was so close
to the killing as to be a part of the
res gestae, even though the homicide occured during flight: Conrad
v. State (1906) 75 Ohio St. 52, 78
N. E. 957. Contra: People v. Giro
(1910) 197 N. Y. 152, 90 N. E. 432;
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People v. Marwig (1919) 227 N. Y.
382, 125 N. E. 535. In general,
however, it may be said that the
attitude of the New York court prevails, that is, escape and flight are
not to be considered as part of the
perpetration of the robbery, which
is completed when the loot is at
rest. At least, in New York, the
question must be submitted to the
jury and the trial judge may not
pass upon it as a matter of law:
People v. Marzig, supra. When
there is some question concerning
the abandonment of the felony, the
courts are strict in stating that the
instructions must be explicit as to
the law applicable to this phase of
the situation. In the principal case
the instruction outlined a b o v e
was found to be erroneous for the
charge had the effect of a directed
verdict, and unless the evidence was
susceptible of only one construction
such an instruction may not stand:
People v. Huter (1906) 184 N. Y.
237, 77 N. E. 6; People v. Schleiman (1910) 147 N. Y. 383, 90 N. E.
950.
The decisions concerning the
question of the status of accessories
may be generalized into two formulas: either the common design to
rob did include the common design
to kill if necessary to escape, in
which case the accessory should
suffer the same penalty as the one
killing; or that it did not, and then
the design to kill in order to escape
was a totally new one which must
be proved, -i.e., it must be proved
that the accessory was accomplice to
the new design before he may be
held for murder: Romero v. State
(1917) 101 Neb. 650, 164 N. W.
554. New York follows the second
formula through the majority in
the principal case does not discuss
the matter. Judge Crane in the
dissenting opinion followed the first
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formula when he held, in effect,
that since a robbery was committed
and someone was killed all were
guilty of first degree murder. Those
courts that adhere to the first view
make the vital assumption, that
when armed criminals commit robbery they are prepared to kill in
order to effect their escape. Those
that follow the second view contend
that persons may be prepared to
rob, and yet not prepared to "resist
to the death" but may prefer to surrender if caught. If, in the principal case, the court had adhered to
the first formula, the defendants
other than Walsh would have been
.convicted of first egree murder
merely by proving the felony. Perhaps the State, attracted by the ease
of prosecution, attempted to base its
!case upon this theory. The first
view illustrates the possible harshness in applying accessory statutes
for it has been held that even if
the accessory attempts to dissuade
his companions from kaking life,
where the killing was in furtherance of the felony, he was guilty of
first degree murder: People v. Marriques (1922) 188 Cal. 602, 206 Pac.
63.
The situations arising under the
second formula are usually tried as
conspiracy cases, and it must be
shown that the conspiracy extended
not only to the, robbery but also
to the killing: State v. Marwig,
supra; State v. Roselli (1921) 109
Kan. 33, 198 Pac. 195. In such a
case if the defendants'bad ended
their felonious intent and were seeking to escape, a killing would not
be a felony murder unless the above
conspiracy was shown, or else deliberation was proved. In the principal case it would have been difficult 'to prove that the conspiracy
extended to the taking of life to
effect an escape, and no common

design to kill could have been assumed since two of the defendants
had given themselves up immediately after *they were confronted by
the arresting officers. In New York,
the frequent reversals of the cases
tried as felony murders when there
are several defendants point to the
fact that the New York Court of
Appeals is sensible of the harshness of the accessory statutes as
applied to this offense. Since the
crime has but one penalty and that
one the most extreme in the list
of penalties it is no wonder that a
trial practically clear of error is
insisted upon and reversals are frequent.
RAYMOND NAJARIAN.
ENFORCEA1ILITY OF PROSECUTORS'
AGREEMENT

No-'e

TO

PROSECUTE.-

[West Virginia] In 1925 fourteen
indictments were returned against
the defendant for violation of the
state banking laws. It was agreed
between the defendant's counsel
and the prosecuting attorney with
the approval of the court that if
the defendant should plead guilty
to one indictment mid aid the commissioners to liquidate the accounts
of the bank, he would be discharged
from the other thirteen indictments.
Both parties carried out the agreement, the defendant was sentenced
to ten years imprisonment and
the other indictments were nolle
prassed. After some time served
the defendant obtained his release
on good behavior. An indictment
was later presented containing the
same charges that appeared in one
of the dismissed indictments. The
lower court ruled against the defendant's special plea based upon
Held, rethe above agreement.
versed: an agreement approved by
the court between a prosecuting attorney and an accused not to prose-
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cute should be upheld when the accused has fulfilled his part of the
agreement: State v. Ward (West
Va. 1932) 165 S. I. 803.
The decision in this case might
well raise the constantly recurring
question of the justification of such
a procedure on the part of prosecuting attorneys or courts or both.
But the practice has at least the
approbation due to long usage and
the plain necessities of successful
criminal prosecution. It has long
been found useful in the detection
and punishment of crime to resort
to aid and information obtained
from the criminals themselves: 1
Wharton "Criminal Law" (12th ed.
1932) sec. 401; Rex v. Rudd (1875)
98 Eng. Rep. 1114. The necessity
certainly has not diminished now
that many crimes are committed by
highly organized groups. Countless
cases arise in which agreements are
made between prosecuting attorneys
and the accused whereby criminal
prosecutions are dismissed in return
for aid given to the state by the
accused. In the most common of
these cases, an accessory turns state
witness against his co-defendants:
People v. Bogolowski (1927) 326
Ill. 253, 157 N. E. 181; Nickelson
v. Wilson (1875) 60 N. Y. 362;
Lowe v. State (1909) 111 Md. 1,
73 Atl. 637, 24 L. R. A. (N. s.) 439;
Cainron v. State (1893) 32 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 180, 22 S. W. 682.
Often the defendant pleads guilty
to one or more indictments in consideration that other indictments be
dismissed: State v. Kiewel (1926)
166 Minn. 302, 207 N. W. 646; State
v. Lopez (1854) 19 Mo. 255; State
v. Keep (1917) 85 Ore. 265, 166
Pac. 936. And the prosecuting attorney may agree to dismiss the
original felony charges in an indictment if the defendant will plead
guilty to a lesser offense: Rep. of
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Sub-Commission on Statistics of
Crime Commission of N. Y. State
(1927) p. 8. In one case the indictment against the accused was
dismissed in order to make his wife
a competent witness against the
other defendants: Rios v. State
(1898) 39 Tex. Cr. Rep. 675.
In practice the condonation and
compromise of criminal cases is
frequent: J. Miller "The Compromise of Criminal Cases" (1927) 1
So. Cal. L. Rev. 1. Admittedly such
a course offers a premium to treachery and sometimes permits the
more guilty to escape, yet it tends
to break up criminal combinations
and to lead to the punishment of
those who might otherwise escape.
Courts generally agree that the accused who has advanced information to aid the state should be given
some protection. In any event, it
would seem that the courts and the
prosecution are bound in honor, at
least under some circumstances, to
carry out the understanding whereby a witness testifies and admits, in
so doing, his own turpitude: United
States v. Lee (1846) 4 McLean 103,
PFed. qase No. :15,588; People v.
Wipple (N. Y. 1826) 9 Cow. 707;
Commonwealth v. St. John (1899)
173 Mass. 566, 54 N. E. 254.
Assuming, then, that the practice
of awarding immunity to criminals
may be to some extent justified, it
remains to determine which of several methods is the more expedient
and effective in accomplishing the
ends of the prosecution. In this
respect the authorities are in conflict. As the present time, three
methods are generally used: first,
by the enforcement of the agreement between the prosecutor and
the defendant made with the apWight v.
proval of the court:
Rindskoff (1877) 43 Wis. 344;
State v. Moody (1873) 69 N. C. 29;
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State v. Graham (1879) 41 N. J.
15; Scribner v. State (1913) 9
Okla. Cr. 465, 132 Pac. 933; Penal
Code of Cal. (1931) sees. 1385,
1386; Ore. L. 0. L. sees. 1696, 1697,
1699; State v. Keep, supra; State
v. Kiewel, supra; second, by agreements between prosecutor and defendant without the knowledge of
the court: People v. Bogolowski,
supra; Camron v. State, supra;
Kansas v. Finch (1929) 128 Kan.
665, 280 Pac. 910, 66 A. L. R. 1369;
and third, by judicial recommendation to the chief executive that a
pardon be granted: United States
v. Ford (1879) 99 U. S. 594; State
v. Graham, supra; State v. Lyon
(1879) 81 N. C. 600; Lowe v. State,
supra; State v. Lopez, supra. The
question then is: What governmental
official should have the final power
to grant immunity-the prosecutor,
the judge, or the chief executive?
The best method would appear to
be that adopted in the instant case
.wherein the prosecution and the
court combined assume the power
to dismiss criminal actions. Certain objections to the method which
relies solely on executive pardon
present themselves. First, there is
the expense and delay of trial, appeal and review by the executive.
Second, the necessary uncertainty
accompanying a plea for executive
clemency militates against a willingness on the part of the defendant to agree to any deal with the
prosecution. Of course, the granting of immunity by the prosecutor
alone is a questionable practice and
subject to grave abuses. It is a
weapon which may produce good
results but the weapon is an extraordinarily dangerous one as its use
is secret, it opens the prosecutor's
to the "fixer," and it welcomes the
play of outside influences upon
criminal prosecution. The method

followed in the instant case is not
subject to these objections. On the
contrary the combination of prosecutor and judge, the former with
the intimate knowledge of the
merits and necessities of the case,
the latter with the power to curb
an abuse of the power, is a complementary one. And the criminal,
assured of a greater certainty that
the agreement will be enforced, will,
in all probability, be less reluctant
to enter into such an agreement.
SAMUEL NICOSIA.

COURTS -

STATE

JURISDICTION

OVER FEDERAL PROBATIONER.-[Fed-

eral] The defendant was indicted
and convicted in a federal cburt
for violating the provisions of the
National Banking Act. In the face
of extenuating circumstances his
sentence was suspended and he was
placed on probation. During this
probationary period state authorities seized him for an alleged violation of a state statute without
first obtaining the permission of the
federal government.
Held: the
petitioner should be discharged from
custody on the ground that he was
under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal court, although out on
probation, and therefore not subject to prosecution by the state government without the consent of the
federal
authorities:
Grant v.
Guernsey (C. C. A. 10th 1933) 63
F. (2d) 163.
For jurisdictional purposes the
federal and state governments are
separate and distinct, each sovereignty having the right to punish offenders o'f its criminal law
without molestation by the other.
However, to prevent friction, the
law rewards diligence in apprehending wrongdoers by giving to
the court which first takes the sub-
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ject-matter of the litigation into its
custody, whether this be person or
property, the right to exhaust its
remedy before the other court may
attempt to take it for its purpose:
United States v. Traeger (C. C. A.
9th 1930) 44 F. (2d) 312; In re
Johnson (1897) 167 U. S. 120, 17
Sup. Ct. 735; CovelL v. Heyman
(1884) 111 U. S. 176, 4 Sup. Ct.
355; Taylor v. Taintor (1872) 83
U. S. 366; Abelnan v. Booth (1858)
62 U. S. (21 How.) 506.
The problem involved in the instant Gase is whether t~he probationer can be considered to be in
the custody of the federal authorities so as to clothe them with exclusive jurisdiction over him. The
term "custody" is one susceptible
of broad interpretation and may be
a convenient vehicle to a desirable
result. The question then devolves
into one of expediency rather than
It is
one of mere definition.
worthy of note that the term "custody" is not limited to actual physical detention but is capable of receiving a more liberal interpretation so as to embrace constructive
podsession, as wbere it has been
held that a writ of habeas corpus
will issue even though the petitioner
is at liberty on bail: Adamy v.
Parkhurst (C. C. A. 6th 1932) 61
F. (2d) 517; MacKenzie v. Barrett
(C. C. A. 7th 1905) 141 Fed. 964.
In an analogous situation it has
been held that one out on parole
is in "custody" so as to be immune
to extradition in the absence of
waiver of jurisdiction: Cozart v.
Wolf (1916) 185 Ind. 505, 112 N.
E. 241. Cf. State v. Freauff (1926)
117 Ore. 214, 243 Pac. 87.
The doctrine of comity which exists between both sovereignties
makes possible the smooth admin-.
istration of governmental processes
with the aim of achieving justice.
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An excellent example of this cooperation is evidenced by the case
of Ponzi v. Fessenden (1922) 258
U. S. 254, 42 Sup. Ct. 309, which
held that a federal prisoner, while
serving sentence, may be lawfully
taken on a writ of habeas corpus
with the consent of the AttorneyGeneral, into a state court and there
put on trial upon indictments there
pending against him. In the instant
case no permission was sought or
given by a federal official to try
the defendant in a state court. Inasmuch as he was not incarcerated
but out on probation, the necessity
for obtaining this formal consent
or approval was seemingly obviated.
,Certainly the federal government
did not expressly prohibit the defendant's trial in the state court but
on the contrary it might be said to
have tacitly acquiesced. It is submitted that since the prior exclusive jurisdiction is a right of the
court itself, and not a personal
privilege of the defendant, the latter should not be permitted to avail
himself of that defense:
United
States v. Taylor (D. C. Tenn. 1921)
284 Fed. 489; United States v. Marrin (D. C. Penn. 1915) 227 Fed.
314. So far as the prisoner is concerned, it is well-settled that he may
not be heard to complain if one
sovereignty waives its strict right to
exclusive custody of him for vindication of its laws in order that
the other may also subject him to
conviction for crimes against it:
United States v. Taylor, supra; In
re Andrews (D. C. Vt. 1916) 236
Fed. 300. He should not be permitted to use the machinery of one
sovereignty to obstruct his trial in
the courts of the other, unless the
necessary operafion of such Inachinery prevents his having a fair
trial: Ponzifv. Fessendei, supra. It was aptly pointed out in the
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dissenting opinion that the trial in
the state court would violate none
of the conditions of the defendant's
probation. For this reason it may
be that the federal authorities declined to assert their rights to the
custody of the defendant. At any
rate, it is universally conceded that
delay in trial is one of the greatest
hindrances in securing criminal justice and where that obstacle may be
overcome with little difficulty it
should readily be done. Since no
great harm could have been done in
the case under consideration, the
state should have been permitted to
proceed with the trial, although it
could not have carried out any sentence inconsistent with the terms of
the defendant's probation. The doctrinal result of the instant case imposes no great hardship on the state
because the federal government, in
a spirit of reciprocal comity, probably would have relinquished control over the defendant if requested
so that he could be tried in the state
court.
STANLEY GORDON.

MURDER - PLEA OF GUILTY BY
PERSON PRESUMED TO BE INSANE.-

[Illinois] The defendant, a fugitive
from the state hospital for feebleminded and epileptic persons, in
which he had been confined by order of the juvenile court, killed the
deceased in an attempted holdup.
Arraigned shortly thereafter, be
pleaded not guilty, indicating at the
same time that his defense would
be insanity. In view of this fact
the court directed two alienists to
examine him for the purpose of
determining whether he was mentally competent. On the day set
for the submission of their conclusions, however, the defendant asked
leave to withdraw his former plea
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and to substitute a plea of guilty.
Although the only evidence of his
restoration to sanity was an unsworn report by the state's psychiatrist, the court accepted it as conclusive and granted the accused's
request. Then, other testimony relating to his mental condition having been introduced in mitigation
and aggravation of the offense at
the hearing, sentence of death was
pronounced. Held: on appeal, reversed and remanded. The mental
competence of a defendant, who has
been adjudicated insane and who is
therefore presumed to continue to
be so, must be proved by the state
before a plea of guilty is entered,
not subsequent to it. And the mere
unsworn statement in writing of an
alienist, even if seasonably offered,
will not operate to rescind the decree of a court of record finding
the accused to be Feeble-minded:
People v. Varecha (1933) 353 Ill.
52, 186 N. E. 607.
The universal rule, embodied in
a long line of decisions, has always
been that a plea of guilty may be
received only if made freely and
voluntarily and with complete understanding of its nature and effect:
Fogus v. U. S. (1929) 34 F. (2d)
97; Pope v. State (1909) 56 Fla.
81, 47 So. 487; People v. Utter
(1920) 209 Mich. 214, 176 N. W.
424. Thus a conviction based upon
such a plea must be reversed whenever it appears that the defendant
acted under a misapprehension of
its consequences: People v. Lavendowski (1927) 327 Ill. 173, 157 N.
D. 193; People v. Byzon (1915)
267 Ill. 498, 108 N. E. 685; People
v. Kleist (1924) 311 Ill. 179, 142
N. E. 486; People v. Carzoli (1930)
340 Ill. 587, 173 N. E. 141; or in
reliance upon an unfulfilled promise by the public prosecutor: Lowe
v. State (1909) 111 Md. 1, 73 Atl.
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stand and continue binding upon all
637; People v. Bogolowski (1925)
317 Ill.
460, 148 N. E. 260; contra: persons whom it may concern until
rescinded or otherwise regularly
Camnaratav. U. S. (1924) 2 F. (2d)
650; or upon a false assurance by superseded or set aside: Ill. Rev.
counsel that he had "arranged"
Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1931) ch. 23
matters with the state's attorney:
sec. 354. But independently of any
People v. Walker (1911) 250 Ill. legislation upon the subject, it has
427, 95 N. E. 475. Likewise, since been held in practically all jurisvolition and understanding on the dictions that where insanity is
part of the accused are requisites proved as existing at a particular
for a plea of guilty, and since the period it will be presumed to condefense of insanity would be incontinue until disproved: People v.
sistent with it, no person of un- Maynard (1932) 347 Ill. 422, 179
N. E. 833; Allams v. State (1905)
sound mind will be allowed to plead
guilty: Taylor v. State (1918) 88
123 Ga. 500, 51 S. E. 506; Cochran
Tex. Cr. Rep. 470, 227 S. W. 679. v. State (1913) 65 Fla. 91, 61 So.
The correct procedure is to con187.
Contra.' Commonwealth v.
sider the issue of mental infirmity
Calhoun (1913) 238 Pa. 474, 86
under a plea of not guilty: Yantis Atl. 472. The .only qualifications
v. State (1923) 95 Tex. 541, 255 S. are: (1) that the insanity must be
of a permanent, continuing, or habW. 180; Ex parte Maple (1930)
116 Tex. Cr. Rep. 383, 33 S. W. itual type and not merely spasmodic
(2d) 734.
or temporary: Sims v. State (1903)
If, however, a defendant with no
17 Tex. Cr. Rep. 962, 99 S. W. 555;
previous record of insanity pleads People v. Schmitt (1895) 106 Cal.
48, 39 Pac. 209; and (2) that not
guilty his subsequent motion for
the suspension of sentence lies with- too long a period elapse between
the finding of mental incompetence
in the broad discretion of the court:
People v. Croce (1929) 208 Cal. and the commission of the crime
123, 280 Pac. 526. And the same charged: People v. Maynard, supra.
is true when an accused, on other
Since the accused in the instant
grounds, seeks to withdraw a plea
case met both requirements, a preof guilty:
State v. Shropulas sumption of insanity existed in his
(1927) 164 La. 940, 114 So. 844;
favor, which the state was obliged
State v. Yates (1894) 52 Kan. 566, to rebut in order to validate the plea
35 Pac. 210." Indeed a rule to the of guilty. This duty it performed
contrary "would be replete with to the entire satisfaction of the
mischief," causing undue delay and trial judge; but the Supreme Court
working great hardship upon the was of the opinion that the plea
state: Cark v. State (1895) 57
should not have been received, beN. J. L. 489, 31 Ati. 979.
cause proper evidence of the deAll of these principles seem to be
fendant's sanity had not been presettled law. Appreciable difficulties sented until after, instead of prior
arise only when courts apply them to, its acceptance.
to situations in which presumptions
The question then arises whether,
of insanity are involved. These may as a matter of practical administrahave their origin in a statute, such tion, the time of proof really makes
as the one in Illinois, which spe- such substantial difference as to
cifically provides that an adjudica- constitute prejudicial error.
To
tion of feeble-mindedness "shall this the answer must be in the nega-

CRIMINAL CASES
tive. In fact, if any method is to
be preferred for utilitarian reasons,
it is the one criticized by the Supreme Court.
For, if the determination of the defendant's mental condition were permitted after
his plea of guilty, the State, spared
the necessity of proving every element of the crime, would be able
to save both time and money. As
a result of this decision, however,
public prosecutors when dealing
with criminals who are presumed
to be insane will prefer to try the
issue of mental competency under
a plea of not guilty, rather than go
to the extra expense of providing
the special sanity proceedings impliedly required before a plea of
guilty by the wording of our statute: Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd
1931) ch. 23, sec. 354.
But, disregarding purely practical considerations, the holding of
the Supreme Court seems sound.
Legal terms, though not inflexible,
have their breaking point, beyond

which they may not be strained if
their integrity is to be preserved.
Thus a plea of guilty has always
been defined as a voluntary confession in open court by a sane person, fully capable of appreciating
its consequences. To say therefore
that a plea of guilty may be entered
by one who may or may not be insane but who is presumed to be so
would lend to that term a connotation entirely foreign to it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, motivated in all probability by a desire for logical consistency, delivered the present opinion. But
it may be suggested that the court
could have effected a convenient
compromise by endowing the trial
judge with discretionary powers on
a motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty because of a prior adjudication of insanity instead of granting
the defendant's petition as a matter
of right.
Cf. People v. Croce,
supra.
SAMUEL ZELKOWICH.

